T he competitive dynamics of the global film industry is not frozen in time. The Motion Picture Association of America (MPA) studios have pursued an aggressive strategy of buying out or otherwise dominating the domestic and international distribution chains while generally avoiding cooperation with other nations' producers. This strategy has gone unchallenged largely because other nations and film production companies have lacked a perspective on their own position and potential in the global film industry. With a keener use of existing tools, including co-production, these countries can establish themselves. For instance, Canada, having co-production treaties with both mainland China and Hong Kong (while no other nation has co-production treaties with either), has positioned its film industry to enter the Chinese mass market-either directly or via Hong Kong's free trade agreements-without the crippling import expenses that the other foreign producers face. However, Canada's producers to date have made less creative use of the co-production accord with China using it to more easily access the low-cost animation inputs.
It is in this context that this paper explores the global film industry through the lens of Porter's (1990) Diamond of National Competitiveness. It begins with a brief discussion of each of the four dimensions of the model: factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries, and firm strategy, structure, and rivalry. It then turns to each of the four nations under investigation: US, Canada, China, and Hong Kong. Each country's film industry is discussed in detail with a particular focus on each of Porter's dimensions. The paper concludes with suggestions and recommendations for increasing national competitiveness particularly through the use of co-production treaties.
SOURCES OF NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
"Alliances are no panacea," writes Michael Porter in The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) . Nonetheless, the global movie industry has enduring cliques of which the most powerful is the MPA. The member studios of such alliances have proven competitive in jointly securing new markets while buying up the best of new suppliers, workers or competitors. On the other hand, the closed circles of leading film-making communities have sometimes insulated inept or corrupt managers from perdition (as in the case of Columbia Tri-Star executives, Jon Peters and Peter Guber, made notorious in the exposé Hit & Run) . Either way, it is an industry in which the peripheral members-including independent businesspeople and arm's-length investors-can become acquainted with the short end of the stick.
Indeed, alliances are no panacea but even an ailing one can be formidable. Thus, many other competitors worldwide are tempted to ask: If Hollywood, despite its excesses, is sustainable in unison, could other alliances do as well or better?
As mentioned earlier, according to Porter, the international competitiveness of any industry cluster is shaped by four characteristics of the domestic market:
(1) factor conditions; (2) demand conditions; (3) related and supporting industries; and, finally (4) firm strategy, structure, and rivalry. He also notes the role of government and 'chance' as exogenous influences on the market. Considering each of these categories, it is easy to imagine that a nation's film-making clusters will grow strong under the following conditions:
Factor Conditions
Generally, industries benefit from the presence of strong capital markets, relevant educational institutions, competitive labour pools, and accessible infrastructure. Specifically, the film industry needs large amounts of new financing for every production and it helps if some affluent investors are specifically interested in films (since other industries are often better investments based on general financial criteria). For labour, film productions draw on the graduate pools of university or college programme in acting, directing, script-writing, sound and video recording and editing, and animation. The pay scale can vary greatly between and within productions and hence both the wage 'floor' and the wage 'ceiling' (as influenced by expected standards of living) are relevant to the film industry. Other critical factor conditions can be geographic and cultural closeness to major foreign market such that it is easier for domestic firms to furnish services, film locations or finished movies that are suited to foreign buyers.
1 The world has very few manufacturers of professional-grade film, especially colour film. Even fewer of these manufacturers distribute globally. Within the developing world, some nations' movie industries could be having a significant advantage by proximity to one of the few manufacturers of lowpriced yet professional-grade film.
based on strong domestic demand only to be blindsided by different prevailing conditions in the global market. The market value of movies is the greatest in populous, high-income nations where the families have leisure time. More of this market value accrues to the domestic film producers when the major distributors are biased (by reason of ownership, regulation, culture or simply marketing strategy) in favour of domestic productions. Such favourable demand conditions may or may not be replicable in foreign markets.
Related and Supporting Industries
Frequently, industries benefit from the cooperation and innovations of other industries that share a part of the same value chain. A nation's film industry indirectly benefits from other dramatic venues which help build and retain partly the same labour pool. Domestic suppliers, such as film manufacturers and software designers, may be more likely to respond to the movie-makers' needs and engineer better-looking or more economical inputs. 1 Other media industries build demand for the same home electronics that are essential to distributing movies.
Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
Generally, firms innovate and expand only when actively and intelligently seeking to do so. (Rivalry can be an impetus to this process in some cases or can crush it in other cases.) The most successful film industries feature vertically integrated, oligopolistic studios with market-driven strategies. These firms seem to pursue export opportunities more aggressively and also seem more likely to seek domestic and foreign deregulation instead of government intervention. There are commercially successful niche movie industries, e.g., specializing in animation or action films, yet diversifying across genres appears to be safer in the long run.
Many nations-in fact, most-are not strong across Porter's four determinants. However, film industries are often regarded as a matter of national pride and many governments are eager to support the domestic film industry if a part of most of it is struggling. Government intervention, obviously, is geared for firms that want it. The leading film studios seldom do. For firms that want no intervention, the maximum that the domestic government can do is to pressure foreign governments to deregulate too.
What, then, are the governments doing for the segment of the film industry that wants intervention and does this intervention genuinely contribute to national competitiveness? These questions will be explored in depth later in this paper.
Lastly, going by Porter's model, what would be lumped into the 'chance' or error factor in predicting a nation's competitiveness in the film industry? As with many forms of art, any nation's movie industry has few, if any, globally recognized artists. The birthplace and migration of famous artists is not readily predictable and so it might be called 'chance' if an actor is born in one continent, educated in another, and launched to stardom elsewhere. On the other hand, if an industry can attract an ongoing stream of famous artists, an analyst might credit factor conditions or even strategy instead.
Another 'chance' element described by Porter is 'pure invention.' The movie industry has always found opportunities in inventions which apply to imaging, media, and electronics. Now, the most advanced filmmaking is increasingly intertwined with digital production and distribution methods. (This may be partly attributable to related-industry and firm strategy or ownership factors.) On the downside, some inventions such as the World Wide Web make it much easier to distribute pirated movies.
OVERVIEW OF FOUR NATIONAL FILM INDUSTRIES
The global industry of feature motion pictures (i.e., movies which are first released in cinema) generated retail revenues of about US$75 billion in 2004. This market has grown rapidly via both its main distribution channels: cinemas, which are becoming increasingly consolidated even as the global box office grows; and home video, which has also exhibited high growth since the introduction of the DVD format. Traditionally, about half of the industry's global market value has been concentrated in the US but growth rates in recent years have been greater in Europe, Asia Pacific, and Canada. An exception to the patterns of growth was 2003 when box offices stagnated or declined in many major markets across the globe. The US box office has not recovered from this stagnation but other markets boomed in 2004.
The seven US studios of the MPA, as an oligopoly, capture over 70 per cent of the US market every year (and as much as 85% in 2003) . However, these companies' production and marketing costs are outstripping the growth of the US market. Domestically, the MPA studios recover just slightly more than their costs. This means that their financial success is going to depend increasingly on their power to export movies via highmargin, high-growth, foreign distribution channels. Canada's movie market is only about one-fifteenth the size of the US counterpart and only about 1.7 per cent of Canada's box office is captured by domestic productions. One reason is that Canada's most successful production companies can achieve greater access to inputs and markets by shifting operations to the US subsidiaries instead. Meanwhile, the Canadian government agencies foster an unfounded expectation that the modestly subsidized domestic productions would achieve proportionally higher box office yield than the high-budget MPA films. A more promising avenue for the Canadians to produce high-budget, internationally competitive films may be the nation's co-production treaty network but the producers have somehow continued to underutilize these opportunities.
China has an appeal for the film producers across the globe due to the large potential audience there. However, government regulation drains most of the value out of this market for foreign and domestic firms alike. The means are onerous import contracts and preferential use of subsidies and production/distribution permits.
At the start of the 90s, Hong Kong film studios were second only to the MPA. Since then, they have scaled down alarmingly. This could be attributed to the restrictions imposed by mainland China plus the aggressive MPA marketing in Asia. Free trade between Hong Kong and the mainland was finally enacted under Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) in June 2003.
GLOBAL INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
The working definitions of the term 'film industry' may encompass the entire value chain for motion pictures: production, reselling, and end-selling alike. Within each part of this value chain, there are many ways to segment the competing firms by size or business model and products or services by format or genre. To complicate matters further, advances in media and distribution have created substantial overlaps between the value chains of movies and of other mass entertainment products.
To begin with, how do we define the product? A motion picture consists of long, continuous, non-interactive, recorded audio-visual content designed to be delivered to an audience. 'Long' might imply over 90 minutes and 'continuous' might imply that the images and sound progress in facsimile of real time. The exact means of delivering the content to the audience is not specified in this definition.
Under this definition fall three categories of films with largely distinct production processes: 'photoplays' (camera-recorded performance drama), animated cartoons, and documentaries / educational films (Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1998).
Animations are dissimilar from photoplays and documentaries in that their native image format is not photographic; rather, they are illustrated slides or (more often, in some markets) vector-based computer graphics. Vector-based computer graphics, as opposed to rasteur-based (pixel-based), are mathematical rather than dot-by-dot descriptions of the image. This allows the displayed image to be enlarged or shrunk without loss of information, and, in its most sophisticated form, allows objects, paths of motion, lighting effects, and angles of view to be defined in three-dimensions. Animations and photoplays are both dissimilar from documentary/ educational films in that the latter follow the principles of non-fictional media and face different distribution systems and markets accordingly.
Although documentary/educational films are more numerous than photoplays and animations combined, the latter two categories-together, sometimes referred to as 'theatrical films,' as they are often designed for cinema-are the focus of this research. Their distribution channels are nearly identical as the storage formats for photoplays and animations are interchangeable after production: audio-visual content of either source is readily transferable among film reel, VHS, DVD, computer CD, hard disk or broadcast. The advancement of the production business for theatrical films has coincided with the development of an international distribution system and mass consumer demand for these films. The distribution system and the consumer demand sometimes have surprisingly consistent features across political, economic, and cultural boundaries.
Classified as 'medium tech,' the technical aspects of producing and distributing fiction films are not prohibitively complex. The business reality is that only a few competitors in any nation are capable of producing films in volume and consistently ensuring that they are purchased by resellers and end-sellers (even though many of these companies have low bargaining power too). The thin upper crust of film production companies that do have these mass production and distribution capabilities are known as studios. They are characterized by strong financial and relational assets in such forms as public equity, large-scale bonds, cross-holdings or long-term contracts with distributors, and broad access to artistic talent. By contrast, 'independent film-makers'-which might cover the entire spectrum of film production firms in some regions-may be forced to rely on private equity, small-scale loans, one-time contracts, and local talent in order to produce any commercially viable project.
The value chain functions are different for independents and studios. A studio begins by seeking out, accepting or commissioning a script, then hires a director who can draw on the studio's existing sources of financing to hire the cast and crew, produce the picture, and outsource where useful. (The director may operate a company in his or her own right.) An independent starts by finding or writing a script and often takes direct control of casting and producing. Before progressing to this directing stage, however, the independent would have to secure new financing and pre-sales or else take a leap of faith on the project. Thus, 'the pitch' to financiers and buyers alike stands in the middle of independents' product development process. Downstream in the value chain, studios are usually capable of doing much of their distribution in-house. For foreign sales, they often operate through locally-based resellers with whom they hold exclusive agreements. A few endsellers also have their own international distribution capabilities which would be leveraged through more direct dealings with studios. The opportunities for independent film-makers to deal with resellers and international end-sellers are limited unless the film has already demonstrated enough commercial viability to attract attention from one of the major studios' acquisition divisions which typically purchase the rights to co-brand and redistribute the production internationally. Even then, these are normally one-off deals. Under these circumstances, independent producers often have difficulty building up their resource base from one project to the next.
The focus of this study is on the major studios and on the ways in which independents can raise the resources to function as if they were studios. The existing mechanisms for doing so include co-ventures and coproductions. A co-venture is a joint venture entity established by two or more film production companies for the purpose of collaboratively producing one film. The founding firms of the co-venture need not be based in the same country but the co-venture itself must have one country as its base. A co-production is an agreement between two or more film production companies of different nationalities to share ownership of a project to which each company contributes subject to regulation by special international treaty. Most importantly, coproduction treaties allow the film to be treated as a domestic product in the home country of each contributing firm. This not only improves market access but also makes the project eligible for more subsidies, tax exemptions, and so on. Thus, where they are allowable by treaty, co-productions offer more benefits than international co-ventures. Figure 1 is another way of viewing the above information about the value chain and international distribution structure for motion pictures.
The gross of the worldwide cinema box office was measured as US$25.23 billion by the MPA for 2004. The MPA's regional break-up and recent historical figures for this market segment are reproduced in Table 1 .
Box office receipts are the most common measure of a film's commercial success because they are the most readily available: the product's lifecycle in the theatre is much shorter than its lifecycle in the rental store. However, 60 per cent of the movie industry's total revenue, according to one rental chain's intelligence, comes from video rentals and sales (Video Headquarters, 2001 ). Suppose, broadcasting (cable, satellite, payper-view) and ancillary goods account for another 5-10 per cent of the revenue, then the total market size across segments would be about three times the amount given in Table 1 . For 2003, this put the global movie industry in the US$60 billion category-the same size as the global coffee industry, the global fitness/nutrition industry, the US tourism industry or the US bridal industry, and just over half the size of the US fast-food industry (Google search, 2003) .
Film Industry in the US
The US, as already seen, maintains almost as much movie consumption in dollar terms as the rest of the world combined. The nation's film industry is also one of the world's most productive in terms of number of movies produced or released annually. Time series of these data from the MPA (2002) (2003) (2004) are contained in Table 2 .
Two crucial trends are evident from the MPA data. First, from 1996 to date, the annual number of the US film releases has finally been hitting levels comparable to those of the pre-1960s heydays. (The coming of the television into the home was the worst thing that ever happened to the US feature film industry. By contrast, the Great Depression was the best as the unemployed and the impoverished flocked to cheap entertainment at cinemas.) The second trend is that the annual number of the US movies produced has dropped since 1999, while the number of movies released has fluctuated a little. This suggests one or both of two things: (1) film producers are implementing tighter 'quality control systems' in order to identify non-starters before they are produced; or (2) producers who have been making nonstarters are going out of business. Tables 3A and 3B can be derived. During 1999-2001, the MPA member companies were generating a growing per-film gross on the decreasing film releases while other distributors were generating a decreasing per-film gross on the increasing film releases. For 2002 (compared to 2001), however, MPA members generated less per-film gross on more film releases while others generated greater per-film revenues on fewer film releases. The total box office consolidation under MPA companies during 1999-2002 fluc- tuated only a little around an average of 76.3 per cent. However, in 2003, the MPA box office share jumped to 84.9 per cent with the total gross from MPA films rising dramatically despite fewer MPA releases. Nonetheless, the US box office shrank during this year as an increased number of independent releases failed to offset a sharp drop in the per-film gross of independent films. Thus, for 2002, compared to the previous years, the data did not indicate increasing consolidation under the oligopoly but it did indicate increasing consolidation among the independents. In 2003, the industry took another direction with the independent industry being severely diluted as MPA studios produced bigger hits. The trend changed again in 2004. Who belongs to this MPA oligopoly and who are the 'other distributors?' The answer is not entirely obvious due to the complexity of ownership patterns in the US film industry. For its own statistical purposes, the MPA's criterion for an 'MPA film' seems to be not the production label but the distribution label which is more inclusive of affiliated studios. Table 4 This way of viewing the US movie industry is instructive in two ways. First, it shows that many of the iconic 'Hollywood' brands are, in fact, rather remote appendages of global media conglomerates. Even Walt Disney Co., the world's third largest media conglomerate, derived just 24 per cent of its FY 2000 revenues from its studios compared to 27 per cent from its theme parks and 17 per cent from its broadcasting networks (PBS Frontline, 2003) . A second feature of these ownership structures is that they make for strange bedfellows: a series of mergers and acquisitions have created many partnerships among studios with dissimilar backgrounds and genres-partnerships that might have been beyond the means or wishes of these studios to create themselves. Under the merged corporate structure, physical 'studios'-workplace and equipment-may belong to one subsidiary such as the Sony Pictures Studios, while the libraries of finished films are divided among other subsidiaries, such as the Columbia TriStar companies (SPE, 2003) . Thus, by design, some subsidiary studios are light on intangible assets while others are light on tangibles and they function in combination to produce a movie. The MPA member studios usually produce highbudget films while letting their subsidiaries and affiliates compete in the comparatively low-budget product segments. Specifically, the total negative costs and marketing costs for MPA affiliate-/subsidiary-produced films in 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999 and 1998, respectively, averaged 59 .9 per cent, 50.6 per cent, 52.1 per cent, 38.4 per cent, 32.8 per cent, and 35.0 per cent of these costs for MPA member-produced films (MPA, 2004) . The recent narrowing of this gap may be attributable to several major affiliate-/subsidiary-produced movies such as New Line's Austin Powers and The Lord of the Rings series. The rising production costs, for both MPA members and the affiliates/subsidiaries, are not necessarily healthy, though. Tables 5A and 5B serve to contrast growth patterns in the total US box office with growth patterns in MPA members' costs (MPA, 2002 (MPA, -2004 . The indications are unfavourable.
If the long-term trends are to persist, the MPA members' US market position would appear to be economically untenable. The number of MPA releases (production volume) is growing at a greater rate than the US box office admissions (demand volume) and the average cost of each release is growing at a greater rate than the average ticket price. Meanwhile, as seen earlier, MPA members' percentage share of the dollar box office is approximately level. Simply to recoup the US$20 billion negative costs and the marketing costs of their releases in 2002 (ignoring other costs including those associated with any films produced but not released), the MPA members required one-third of the global market. Equivalently, if the MPA members captured three-quarters of the whole US movie market in 2002 (the same as their percentage share as in the box office), then the domestic sales did slightly more than cover their costs.
The unfeasibility of profiting from the box office alone is driving the US studios to explore the emerging, 
Canada and Co-production
The long-standing, over-riding concern of the Canadian film producers and the public film financing agencies has been how to compete with the US studios. Table 5A , the year-to-year price and attendance changes of this scale are unparalleled in the history of the US cinema. The MPA suggests that the SARS virus affected the Canadian cinema attendance in 2003. This explanation seems inadequate given that the outbreak occurred outside of peak cinema seasons and that SARS had limited economic impact on the other non-tourism industries except in Toronto. For 2004, the box office growth was strong in both US$ and CDN$ terms.
Canada is home to one internationally recognized film corporation-Lion's Gate Entertainment-which owns the Canadian-based studio and distributor of the same brand name as well as the US-based studios, Table 7 shows the break-up of the company's financials according to its business units and geographic locations.
As seen in the financials, one of the dilemmas that the Lion's Gate has faced-like other Canadian companies with film production capabilities-is that the inhouse production projects are financially much riskier than the alternative sources of revenue. While Lion's Gate's segment contributions for animation services, studio facilities, and 'management services' remained consistently positive over FY 1999 FY -2003 , its TV segment usually yielded negative returns and its motion picture segment took an operating loss in FY 2002. This faltering of the core business in FY 2002, combined with escalating write-downs and write-offs of subsidiary operations, plunged the company's net income deeper into red ink than ever before. While FY 2004 was an even more disastrous year for write-offs, especially in the motion picture segment, in FY 2005, Lion's Gate realized its largest profit till date, albeit with ROA of merely 1.6 per cent.
Throughout its past seven years of fluctuating financial viability, Lion's Gate has been steadily shifting its assets out of Canada and into the US. Similarly, the company's Canadian and other non-US revenues have dropped since FY 2000 while US revenues have been climbing quickly. This underscores another dilemma for the entire Canadian film industry: that the most successful Canadian producers are not primarily producing films in Canada or for Canada. Consider this: In 2002, 58.9 per cent of Lion's Gate's revenues came from its motion picture segment and the box office of its films might have amounted to about one-third of its motion picture revenues-making Lion's Gate's share of Canada's box office about CDN$15.7 million or 2.0 per cent. The problem here is that this is more than the entire domestic (French and English) average share of the Canadian box office. This is due to the fact that Lion's Gate films produced by its US subsidiaries would not be products of Canada. Thus, it is possible for the most successful Canadian-based film studio to contribute to the erosion of the domestic share of the market.
A reasonable rebuttal would be that this statisticsdomestic share of the domestic market-is simply flawed as a measure of national competitiveness in this industry as it fails to acknowledge the international success of firms such as Lion's Gate. Nonetheless, it is this number on which the public Canadian film agencies have pegged their hopes. The federal feature film policy, From Script to Screen, released How feasible is Telefilm Canada's goal of realizing 70 per cent box office yield on its investment? The first consideration is the proportion of financing that will come from non-Telefilm sources. Suppose, half of the total financing for successful films comes from nonTelefilm sources; then the overall box office yield on investment need only be half of 70 per cent, that is, comparable to the MPA studios' US 2002 box office yield of US$7,150.0 million on US$19,668.0 million of negative costs and marketing costs or 36.4 per cent. This comparison, however, ignores the market size difference between the US and Canada. Because the negative costs and marketing costs of motion pictures are largely fixed costs with respect to unit sales volume, market size heavily influences the potential yield on investment. With their fixed investment of US$19,668.0 million in 2002, the MPA studios probably generated no more than CDN$750 million in the Canadian box office or 2.4 per cent yield. At the same yield rate, sustaining a CDN$28 million domestic share of the Canadian box office would require a fixed investment of CDN$1,152 million annually. Telefilm's budget would provide only 3.5 per cent of this sum.
A proponent of the Telefilm plan might argue that the MPA companies' box office yield for Canada is readily beatable because the small, lean Canadian film production companies can save on negative costs and also because the marketing costs for the Canadian market alone should be small. Neither of these defences is valid. First, the Canadian producers that make films with domestic box office receipts of CDN$3-4 million are not small, lean companies. One of the two such films that Telefilm supported during 1998-2002-The Red Violin (2000), with domestic box office of CDN$3.4 millionwas produced by Lion's Gate, and the other-Men With Brooms (2002) with domestic box office of CDN$3.7 million-was produced by the main film studio of Canadian media conglomerate, Alliance Atlantis. The third highest-grossing Telefilm-supported cinema release during 1998 -eXistenZ (1999 with domestic box office of CDN $1.6 million-was also an Alliance Atlantis production (Telefilm Canada, 2002) . Second, saving on marketing costs by limiting the market to Canada would be (in British proverb) "pound foolish, penny wise:" no studio would go to the expense of producing a film with $3-4 million dollar box office potential in Canada without planning to produce proportionally similar results in larger markets such as the US or Europe.
Practically speaking, what Telefilm's new policy amounts to is a modest subsidy for keeping large Canadian producers' operations in Canada. This effort seems unlikely to prove effective, and even if it does, its goal is too narrowly defined to truly address Canada's competitive lag in the global film industry. By 2006-the deadline for the federal government's and Telefilm's challenge-other nations' film industries will have evolved dramatically. New producers in mature markets will have tested schemes to redefine the key success factors of the industry-as Pixar Animation Studios in the US has done in recent years by developing more innovative animation than Disney and then distributing through Disney on an ongoing basis to make up for its own lack of forward integration. New hubs for domestic and international film actors, artisans, and directors will emerge in mass markets with excess demand-as has happened or begun to happen in several East Asian countries. Finally, from countries where the domestic share of the domestic market has already swelled, producers will seek new ways of reaching global audiences while avoiding other studios' distribution nets.
How will Canada interconnect with these broader developments in the global film industry? One way of doing so will be an extensive network of co-production treaties. As one of the pioneers of this type of partnership, Canada has signed co-production treaties with 53 countries (54 counting the defunct USSR) since 1978. Exhibit 1 (A and B) shows the usage of these treaties for television and film productions since 2002.
The leverage available from co-productions in 2002 enabled Canadian producers to participate in the feature film projects with budgets averaging over CDN$7.1 million and ranging to over CDN$32.2 million (for one of the Canada-France-UK partnerships). On average, these budgets were about half financed by the Canadian partner even though the co-production treaties required only 20 per cent or in some cases 30 per cent contribution from any one partner. Notably, co-productions with the UK or with Pacific Rim countries, on average, were over two-thirds financed by the Canadian end. The UK and France continued to be Canadians' co-production partners of choice involved in over four-fifths of the bipartite and multipartite proposals. Less predictably, more Canadian firms chose to co-produce with mainland Chinese firms than with firms in South Africa, Australia or New Zealand. Outside Western Europe, the Commonwealth, and the Pacific Rim, Canadians sought no new co-productions during 2002.
The total budget of CDN$171 million for feature film co-productions in 2002 still left Canada far short of any realistic financing requirements for Telefilm's goaleven considering that the number of 2002 feature film co-productions accounted for only about half of Canada's average, annual, total number of feature film productions (CED, 2001) . Nonetheless, it is encouraging to see evidence of foreign firms' interest in partnering with the Canadians to finance and produce films ranging from the upper end of low-budget to the lower end of high-budget. The main shortcoming of Canada's coproduction treaty network is that it excludes the US and thus cannot nullify the motives for 'offshore' film production in this market. However, companies such as Lion's Gate, already having artistic and business contacts in the US, should be able to leverage both these and the advantages of co-production with other countries to produce movies with large budgets, internationally diversified top talent and technology, and special exemption from certain trade barriers. The Canadians To summarize, the following features define the international competitive position and potential of Canada's film production business: 
Film Industry in China and Hong Kong
The relationship between the US and Canada in the international film industry is in some ways mirrored in the relationship between mainland China and Hong Kong. Canada, a small, mid-sized motion picture market with a small, mid-sized motion picture industry, is overshadowed by its neighbour-a large motion picture market with a large motion picture industry. Meanwhile, China, a large motion picture market with a smallto mid-sized motion picture industry, has historically been overshadowed in this field by Hong Kong, a smallto mid-sized motion picture market with a large motion picture industry. Today, both these industries are struggling.
The playing field for the film industry in mainland China is set almost entirely by government intervention. The China Film Corporation (CFC), which is state-owned, acts as the censoring body and the sole importer for films. The CFC distributes foreign films in one of the two ways: (1) by buying the rights outright; or (2) by 'revenue-sharing' with the foreign producer. Using the first method, the CFC is permitted to import up to as many as one-third of the films as are domestically produced or about 50 foreign films compared to 150 domestic films annually (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 2001). The combination of the CFC's low budget and monopoly power means that these 50 films are chosen on the basis of which producers will swallow the lowest price for their copyright: the typical range as of year 2001 was CDN$1,770 to CDN$3,500 (DFAIT, 2001) . Using revenue-sharing, the CFC may import up to 20 films annually though, in practice, it imports only 10-13-closer to the quota of ten that was in effect before WTO negotiations (DFAIT, 2001) . Under revenue-sharing agreements, the Chinese government's share of foreign films' box office, including taxes, fees, and duties, averaged 87 per cent as of 2000 (Rosen, 2001) .
The Chinese government exerts equally tight control over the domestic film industry. All the 30 film studios remain state-owned despite long-standing predictions of privatization (Zhang, 2003; DFAIT, 2001 ).
Zhang Kun (2003) , a correspondent for the Shanghai Star, understatedly describes the power of these studios:
Only graduates majoring in movie directing have a chance of being assigned a directing job in one of the approved studios. And the state fixes the number of movies that can be produced in a year. "Some studios can't produce even one movie a year," Zhu (an insider) said. … Independent movie making started to appear in recent years. The directors include some movie academy graduates who feel they couldn't realize their ideas in stateowned movie studios … as well as amateurs seeking expression through the art. (The writer names several such directors and their productions some of which have won international awards.) None of the movies mentioned above were ever shown in public cinemas in China. The government intervention in the Chinese film industry extends not only to which movies would reach the box office but also to which ones would sell best in the box office as well. For the so-called 'main melody' films-ones that promote conservative views of the modern Chinese history and politics-the government bodies buy out almost the entire box office and give away the tickets. This meant, for example, that the leading domestic film in the box office in 1996 had its ticket sales 95 per cent subsidized nationally and 99.5 per cent subsidized in Beijing (Rosen, 2001) . There is currently some belief that the Chinese government is planning to scale back this intervention (Rosen, 2003) . Meanwhile, the unsubsidized domestic producers are wedged between Hollywood and their own government.
Thus, the Chinese audience has the option of attending some domestically-made features for free. By comparison, as of 2000, a ticket to a US-produced movie cost 30-60 yuan or over 10 per cent of a typical family's monthly income for one outing (Rosen, 2001) . Despite this premium paid by the viewer, the ten or so revenuesharing movies imported per year captured about 70 per cent of the box office-and ticket prices for these films were rapidly dropping (Rosen, 2001) . Another option available to Chinese consumers has been to purchase pirated movies on VCD or now DVD. Pirated VCDs in 2000 cost only about 8 yuan substantially undercutting ticket prices for foreign movies (Rosen, 2001) . Worse, the pirated versions of foreign productions or independent domestic productions often hit the market before the legitimate version can get past the approval process (Rosen, 2000; Zhang, 2003) .
From the combination of government intervention and rising popularity of the US films in mainland China, the film industry that has suffered the most-besides the domestic one-is that of Hong Kong. Although officially part of the People's Republic of China since 1997, Hong Kong was, until June 2003, subject to the same trade barriers as a foreign nation. Thus, to enter the mainland Chinese market without having its copyright sold outright for a pittance, a Hong Kong film had to be coproduced with a Chinese company or had to compete for one of the 20 places theoretically allowed for revenue sharing. For several reasons, Hong Kong films had become less competitive with US films for these 20 or fewer places. One reason is that many of Hong Kong's studios are seeking cheaper labour and land and easier mainland market access across the channel in Shenzhen while many of its star actors are now pursuing careers in Hollywood (DFAIT, 2002; Rosen, 2001) . Notably, actor/director, Jackie Chan-who was the favourite actor of 18.6 per cent of the urban Chinese high school students as of 1999, with Arnold Schwarzenegger a distant second at 8.1 per cent (Rosen, 2001 )-had already left China and Hong Kong at the height of his career. Golden Harvest, the studio for which Chan worked and the world's largest distributor of Chinese-language films, has cut its number of in-house productions to about onefifth its peak (late-1980s) levels (Golden Harvest, 2003) .
More broadly, the troubles of Hong Kong's domestic film industry are observable in the declining box office size and the declining share of the domestic box office. An increase in Hong Kong's audio-visual exports is only partly compensating for these trends, while in 1991, the domestic and international markets for Hong Kong films supported over 300 releases-more than any other country except for the US-the production levels had sunk to less than half of this by 2001 and less than one-third by 2002 (DFAIT, 2002; TDC, 2003) . Table 8 , based on current data from the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (TDC), further illustrates the situation.
As in other countries, the film industry of Hong Kong now hopes for more liberalized trade with mainland China. As of June 2003, CEPA (Closer Economic Partnership Agreement between Hong Kong and the Mainland) has exempted the Hong Kong films from the import quota of 20 and permitted the Hong Kong companies to have the majority ownership in the cinema joint ventures (TDC, 2003) . However, even assuming that these provisions do lead to greater official acceptance of Hong Kong film exports in practice, the competitive position of Hong Kong's film industry has drastically changed. More than ever, for its survival globally, the large Hong Kong film industry is intertwined with the large market and heavy regulations of the neighbouring mainland.
Of the foreign film industries that do not pose a competitive threat in Hong Kong or mainland China, Canada's has been the most active in these regions. The Canadian government holds the only external co-production treaties with Hong Kong and mainland China. Since the signing of the Chinese co-production treaty in 1997, there have been 21 Canada-China co-productions (seven in 2002) of which 20 were animations. For most of these projects, the Canadian partner has provided the majority of the financing. The Canadian partner has usually been either Nelvana Limited (the animation subsidiary of media conglomerate, Corus Entertainment) or CINAR (an independent animation company). The Chinese partners have been chosen on the basis of the ability to perform pre-production, production, and post-production services that are consistent with the North American standards (China Cartoon Industry Forum, 2003) .
This usage of Canada's co-production treaty with China-and the relative lack of usage of the treaty with Hong Kong-is disappointing. The opportunities afforded by co-production go beyond cheaper labour inputs. (Indeed, if the production company needs to rely on outsourced labour in order to be efficient in its core business, then its problems go beyond what co-production is designed to solve.) Rather, the uniqueness of Canada's co-production opportunities in China lies in the mass market and otherwise high import barriers there. The unresponsiveness of Canadian producers to these opportunities may stem in part from misgivings about the potential business partners. Specifically, in order to succeed in distributing this mass market, the partner on the Chinese end would almost certainly need to be one of the state-owned studios. This could expose the Canadian partner to a far greater political/bureaucratic risk than what is experienced domestically. These risks are likely to vary with the content of the movie and hence the trade-off should be assessed separately for each project and each producer.
Co-productions with Hong Kong companies provide an attractive alternative especially since they should now be readily distributable to mainland China under the terms of CEPA. The Hong Kong studios such as Golden Harvest, which have been slowing down their own production, may be eager to invest surplus resources in new, outside sources of artistic talent, especially ones that can lend their movies an appeal in the North American market in addition to the Pacific Rim market.
Given the size of the Chinese market and of the private-sector film industry in Hong Kong, regulatory and competitive changes within these environments will have repercussions throughout the global film industry. If Canada or other nations are poised to pre-empt such changes, their film industries can forge alliances, establish market share, and realize high returns while others are still struggling with import quotas, censorship, and 'revenue sharing.' Ultimately, this audience can be expected to be opened up fully to the US films as well but there is time to get ahead first.
To sum up, China and Hong Kong, as the key players in the global film industry, are distinguished by these features:
• The potential size of the Chinese film audience has long been attractive to the other nations-particularly the US and Hong Kong.
• The Chinese government's monopoly over film imports via the CFC allows it to purchase the rights to a foreign film for a sliver of the real market value or levy the lion's share of the foreign film's revenue.
• The domestic success in the Chinese film industry is greatly determined by which directors the state sponsors through its official studios and which box offices it buys out. Domestic independent producers are often denied access to the official film dis-tribution channels.
• Despite the massive historical price gap between the domestic and the foreign movies, the box office figures would suggest that the Chinese audiences prefer the latter. Another popular option is cheap, pirated home versions.
• The Hong Kong film industry has suffered from China's import barriers. Many Hong Kong producers, directors, and actors have chosen to attach themselves to the mainland Chinese film industry or to Hollywood rather than face continued pressure from these sources.
• Hong Kong's box office size, domestic box office share, and number of domestic productions have been decimated over the past decade. Now, as trade with the mainland liberalizes under CEPA, the Hong Kong producers' main option is to find stronger opportunities there.
• Canada, being the only external co-production partner nation of China and Hong Kong, has in place the foundations for a powerful competitive position in these regions relative to other foreign entrants.
The usage of the co-production treaty with China needs to be expanded beyond wage arbitrage and into distribution instead. If the prospect of partnering with the state-owned Chinese studios seems too risky to Canadian producers, they should consider entering the mainland via a Hong Kong studio coproduction partner using CEPA.
APPLICATION OF PORTER'S DIAMOND
Porter's theory of national competitiveness posits that four broad dimensions of a country help shape the environment in which the local firms compete. Additionally, these attributes can either promote or impede the creation of national competitive advantage in specific industries. Table 9 illustrates the four determinants of national competitive advantage for the four specific players in the global film industry.
We will now discuss the film industry in each country:
United States of America: The American film industry scores 'strong' on all the four dimensions. It has the requisite skilled labour (albeit expensive), capital, and infrastructure for its film industry to compete globally. The domestic demand for movies is robust with customers demanding more and more advances in products.
There is a strong presence of supporting industries such as photographic supplies, 3 software, and theatres. The virtual monopoly of the MPA means that all roads lead to Hollywood.
Canada:
The Canadian movie industry did not score well on the Diamond. It scored 'moderate' on both factor conditions and supporting industries and 'weak' on demand conditions and firm rivalry. Much of this is due to the relatively small population and few film companies. The proximity of the US did help Canada in terms of factor conditions as low cost labour, medical benefits, positive exchange rate, and tax incentives made Canada 'Hollywood North.' At the same time, control of distribution channels by the US firms and an inability to realize the economies of scale translate the Canadian industry into an industry that has struggled globally.
China: China's film industry scored in the medium range with three dimensions coming in as 'moderate' and with firm rivalry scoring 'weak' due to a lack of commercialization. The large population, cheap supply of labour, and a productive photo film industry position the Chinese movie industry as a potentially global player. However, the strong control exerted by the government through censorship, subsidization, and ownership holds China back. While the large population should signal strong demand conditions, its low levels of disposable income mean that this dimension is not as robust as suspected. An additional dimension is the proliferation of piracy due to the availability of cheap consumer electronics. Piracy is a negative force on the national competitiveness of the Chinese film industry.
Hong Kong: The movie industry in Hong Kong is somewhat analogous to Canada's yet it scores more strongly on two of the dimensions: factor conditions and firm rivalry. Much like Canada with respect to the US, Hong Kong benefits from its large neighbour, China. The proximity to the Chinese population allows Hong Kong to achieve economies of scale. At the same time, Hong Kong has greater capital resources than Canada. However, Hong Kong's own small population is a weakness in terms of demand conditions. The Hong Kong film industry has positioned itself as a niche player in the martial arts genre. Here, the rivalry among film companies is quite intense.
CRITIQUE OF PORTER'S DIAMOND
Porter's work tends to emphasize the features of the home economy as determinants of a national industry's competitiveness. This perspective might be less relevant for an industry that conceives itself as a multinational, particularly if that industry has relied on more than one national economy since the outset. D'Cruz and Rugman (1993) seek to address this issue by expanding the Porter's diamond into a 'double diamond' whereby one set of firm strategy, structure, and rivalry connects with two sets of factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries, and government. Particularly, Rugman (2000) notes the tendency of small markets' export industries to form double diamonds with one corner of the 'triad' of US-Canada, the European Union, and Japan.
Given the dominant global position of the US film industry, Rugman's triad does not fit particularly well here. Japan's film industry is not East Asia's most developed one in terms of either co-production networks or export networks. The European film industries, meanwhile, generate very few hit movies for the US, English, Canadian or East Asian box offices. Typically, the non-US films which do achieve global popularity do so only via an arrangement with the MPA distribution system. Thus, instead of the triad, there has historically been only one major portal to global competitiveness in the film industry-Hollywood in the US. Attempts to Now, co-production strategies purport to be a second global alternative. Much as Rugman (2000) envisions, co-producers seek to leverage multiple sets of inputs into one strategy to serve multiple domestic markets plus export markets, in some cases. Such 'multidomestic' thinking is often heralded as the future of international business. Nonetheless, in the film industry, the revolution does not always seem as radical in practice as it does in theory. Recruiting foreign financiers, foreign actors or foreign animators is, in itself, nothing new even if new legal forms make it more convenient. A treaty and an industry strategy are not one and the same. Ties between two nations' film industries can flourish even without a co-production treaty or flounder even with one.
Keeping this in mind, managers in the film industry do need to look around the globe to see whether-and where-alliances might strengthen their business model. The US film industry is no exception. Cost control continues to be Hollywood's greatest failing, albeit that easy access to financing and markets helps cover it up. Meanwhile, many other nations' film industries, shaped by relatively limited access to financing and markets, have relied on relatively disciplined cost control in order to survive. Because of such complimentary strengths and weaknesses, film industry alliances that include Hollywood or even the US independent producers still have certain obvious benefits over the ones that do not. Accordingly, Lion's Gate-the Canadian studio that attracts the most investment-is also the Canadian studio that invests the most in the US ventures and coventures. Clearly, the strategy and structure of Lion's Gate have evolved within two market contexts and perhaps predominantly the US rather than Canada.
Naturally, few, if any, film producers make a strategic resolution to not partner with Hollywood. The reality is that Hollywood's and, in turn, audiences' demand for new film projects is exceeded by the global supply. By attempting to make global hits out of movies that Hollywood has already refused or in likelihood would refuse to back, other movie producers must bet that MPA studios' methods of forecasting projects' profitability are inefficient or incomplete. The stakes in this bet are high.
Co-production treaties enable film producers from two or more nations to more efficiently share risk across each other's companies and, depending on the availability of grants and subsidies, across each other's governments too. Otherwise, the treaties can offer no guarantee that an industry's fundamental competitive dynamicsaccording to either Porter's or Rugman's model-will change. For instance, despite several China-Canada coproductions to date, Chinese filmmakers have developed no special inroads into the North American market nor have Canadian filmmakers cracked the Chinese market. The MPA distribution system in North America and the state-run distribution system in China both remain nearly impenetrable to outsiders.
Co-production, like Rugman's writings, encourages national industries to pool resources and strategies but, unlike with Rugman's 'triad,' many of the conceivable 'double diamonds' of co-production fail to connect to any global distribution stream. Neither Porter nor Rugman offers an adequate prescription for the scenario where one nation's industry dominates the global export system. For the outsiders to the MPA system, perhaps, the question of how to enter this (one-sided) global competition is not even the correct one. Perhaps, the correct question is how to succeed in the most lucrative areas that (supposedly) global competition has left almost untouched.
Generally, the MPA misses out on one kind of national mass market plus one kind of mass market segment. First, for ideological and protectionist reasons, certain governments attempt to freeze out foreign films, sometimes US films in particular. Such markets often exhibit latent demand for films that reflect foreign popular culture and it is plausible that non-MPA producers who could avoid the barriers could also fulfil this demand. Second, conversely, every nation and region has a popular culture and stars of its own. Hollywood films almost always star English-language actors-only occasionally actors whom foreign audiences would recognize from roles in foreign-language films. Obviously, film producers that are based in the given nation or region have an advantage in serving this particular market demand.
Co-productions have the potential to provide competitive advantages in these two areas where the MPA has none. Even-or perhaps particularly-countries that are protectionist toward cultural industries have begun to embrace co-production in principle. Moreover, by drawing scriptwriters, directors, and cast from more than one country, co-productions are particularly geared toward scripts with multi-cultural interest. Done well, multi-cultural plotlines can strike chords in both cultural audiences and even far beyond.
4 Done poorly, multicultural plotlines may seem forced in everyone's eyes without the advantage of Hollywood-quality escapism. Marketability, not the content requirements of the coproduction treaty itself, still needs to shape the production. The situation of the English Canadian film industry is unusual because popular culture in the home market has so many similarities with popular culture in the US. This contributes to the synergy of the US-Canadian coventures, yet, it increases the competitive overlap between domestic productions and imports from the US. Thus, from both artistic and business perspectives, Canadian film producers might have mixed views on suggestions about relying on either the North American market's commonalities or the Canadian market's particularities. Productions that seem too caught up in the American popular culture could risk being received as low-budget knock-offs. Productions that seem too contrary to American popular culture could miss the mainstream in both the US and Canada. These risks almost resemble the ones that are associated with marketing international co-ventures or co-productions as, indeed, Canadian producers are almost outsiders to the domestic box office.
Porter's method of competitive modelling, as well as Rugman's variant of it, seems to offer partial explanations for the state of the global film industry. (The effort to fit the film industry to the models also reveals how the film industry differs from industries on which the models were based.) However, no iron-clad strategic alternative appears for national industries that are less favoured by the models. To build global competitiveness, such players must either find better ways to serve the MPA distribution system or find better inputs and markets that are still free of this competition. For the latter path, co-production treaties are an incentive but are not enough to make or break producers' strategy. Canadians and other current or potential co-production partners would need to develop as much knowledge about working with each other's markets as Canadians have about working with the US market. This is not an easy task especially with markets such as China where competitive dynamics is rapidly changing. However, with diligence, it should be possible to find 'diamonds' in unexpected places.
CONCLUSIONS: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVENESS
As seen in the analysis of the film industry in the US, Canada, China, and Hong Kong, a competitive film industry has easy access to strong financial resources and large markets while an uncompetitive one stays restricted to low budgets and narrow regions. Large studios and large distributors are also characteristic of an internationally competitive industry even if these giants are not consistently efficient or profitable.
These manifestations of strong competitiveness are obvious but what about their causes? The contributors or detriments to the global competitiveness of a national film industry fall into three types: (1) domestic structural factors which are not proximately caused by the efforts of any one group; (2) regulatory factors which are determined by the nation's government and its interactions with other governments; and (3) strategic factors which are determined within the industry itself.
The US film industry has immense advantages of structural factors: its world-largest domestic market; its concentrated centres of film-making talent; and its abundant financial sources including conglomerated parent companies. The US regulatory factors are largely neutral, laissez-faire: the major studios would be among the stakeholders in the US trade negotiations but, otherwise, they do not particularly rely on intervention from their government. The strategy of the major, MPA studios, is to maintain their oligopoly over production and distribution in the US and other markets, to seek to more profitably break into new markets such as China, and to largely avoid collaboration with other nations' film industries (future competitors).
For the Canadian film industry, the structural factors are less attractive: a small to mid-sized domestic market; the close substitutability of the Canadian film production inputs and outputs by that of the US; and the lack of precedents for high-budget, top-star domestic productions. Regulatory factors, however, are much stronger in Canada than in the US: government funding, though often not allocated based on sound business goals, is widely sought in Canada; and the ambitious expansion of the Canadian co-production treaty network has created tremendous expansion possibilities for the domestic producers. Typical strategies within the industry though are imperfectly aligned with these opportunities: many growth companies still focus on shifting operations to the US while those that keep their main production facilities in Canada are often averse to the risks of fully exploiting the export potential of co-production.
The Chinese film industry is affected by mixed structural factors: on the one hand, while its potential domestic audience is the world's largest, on the other, the disposable income of this audience (by North American standards) is low giving rise to a mass market for cheap, pirated movies. The regulatory approach to this-subsidizing ticket prices for select domestic filmsis preferential. Regulation, indeed, is the greatest threat and basis of rivalry facing Chinese film producers and has largely prevented the private-sector film production competitors from developing viable national, let alone international, strategies of their own.
Post-CEPA, Hong Kong's film industry should be affected by many of the same factors as that of mainland China as Hong Kong producers may look to the mainland as their largest, most accessible market. What is still distinct about the situation of the Hong Kong industry though is its legacy as an inter-cultural film production hub, its liberal economic and regulatory environment, and the possibility that its competitively battered studios will soon be revitalizing their strategic direction.
Despite the impression that the MPA studios or other powerful regional players are unbeatable in the global movie market, no nation's film industry has the advantage in every respect. (Also, no nation's film industry achieves consistent levels of efficiency and profitability.) Notably, what the US lacks and what Canada is ready to provide is a cooperative framework for undermining traditional barriers to the global distribution of motion pictures. Mainland China is one of the highest potential markets for the new distribution dynamics that the international co-production provides and Hong Kong's industry stands to be another major beneficiary.
Further research in this field could include an analysis of co-productions within Europe or emerging co-production blocs across other regions. For instance, Canada is currently in the process of concluding a coproduction treaty with India which has the potential to clear barriers between the two powerful yet traditionally quite segregated film industries of the subcontinent and North America. Such happenings give real reason to believe that the governments and the movie industries are gaining power to change the picture of global competition in films. 
